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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Nicholas Shane Clausen appeals from the district court’s order revoking 
probation. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Clausen with grand theft and burglary.  (R., pp. 49-50.)  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Clausen pled guilty to grand theft and the state 
dismissed the burglary charge.  (R., pp. 83-86.)  The district court sentenced 
Clausen to serve five years with two years determinate, but suspended the 
sentence and placed Clausen on probation for two and one-half years.  (R., 
pp. 97-100.)  The conditions of probation included attending and completing any 
treatment programs as directed by the probation department and performing 100 
hours of community service.  (R., pp. 99-100.) 
 The district court later ordered that Clausen “comply with and successfully 
complete Mental Health Court” as a condition of probation.  (R., p. 162.)  His 
performance in mental health court was problematic, however, resulting in his 
termination from the program after about four months.  (R., pp. 164-79.) 
 The state filed a motion to show cause why Clausen’s probation should 
not be revoked because he had been terminated from mental health court.  (R., 
pp. 190-97.)  The attached reports showed Clausen had been “verbally abusive,” 
had been “kicked out of transitional housing several times,” and was abusing 
drugs.  (R., pp. 192-93; see also R., pp. 195-96, 198-200.)   Clausen admitted 
violating his probation.  (9/2/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 7, L. 16.)  The district court 
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revoked Clausen’s probation, ordered the sentence executed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (9/2/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 25 – p. 28, L. 4; R., pp. 220-21.)  Clausen filed a 
timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 225-26.) 
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ISSUE 
 
 Clausen states the issue on appeal as: 
 Did the district court abuse its discretion by revoking 
Mr. Clausen’s probation in the absence of any finding or admission 
that Mr. Clausen’s probation violation had been “willful”? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Clausen did not claim below his probation violation was not the result of 
his choices or was otherwise not “willful.”  Nor did he request a specific factual 
finding regarding willfulness or object to its absence.  Has Clausen failed to show 
that the lack of an express finding or admission that Clausen’s probation violation 
was willful is fundamental error? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Clausen Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court made no express finding that Clausen’s probation 
violation was willful.  (9/2/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 25 – p. 28, L. 4; R., pp. 220-21.)  Nor 
did Clausen provide an express admission that his probation violation was willful.  
(9/2/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 7, L. 16.)  For the first time on appeal, Clausen argues 
that the lack of an express finding regarding willfulness was error, and requests 
remand for a “new disposition hearing” so he can litigate that previously unraised 
issue.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)  Clausen has failed, however, to claim, much 
less show, fundamental error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “[A]ll claims of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now subject to the 
fundamental error test set forth in [State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 
(2010)].”  State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173, 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013).  To 
show fundamental error, Clausen has the burden of establishing that the error he 
alleges “(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly 
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record ...), and (3) was not harmless.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 
245 P.3d at 980.   
 If the Court concludes this issue was preserved for appellate review, the 
standard of review is as follows:  “In reviewing a probation revocation 
proceeding, [this Court] use[s] a two-step analysis.”  State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 
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102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 
71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)).  The first step “ask[s] whether the 
defendant violated the terms of his probation.”  Id.  “For the first step, a district 
court’s finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the finding.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
“In the event of conflicting evidence, [this Court] will defer to the district court’s 
determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses.”  Id.  If the Court determines 
the defendant did violate his probation, the second step asks “what should be the 
consequences of that violation.”  Id. (citing Knutsen, 138 Idaho at 923, 71 P.3d at 
1070).  “A district court’s decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on 
appeal absent a showing that the district court abused its discretion.”  Id. (citing 
State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 381 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
 
C. Clausen Has Neither Claimed Nor Shown Fundamental Error 
 
 “‘Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, 
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to 
the lower court.’”  State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 44443, 2017 WL 2569786, at *3 
(Idaho June 14, 2017) (quoting Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through 
Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979)).  
Review of the record shows that at no point did Clausen raise the theory that his 
violations were not willful or ask the district court for a specific finding on whether 
his violation was willful.  Thus, any claims that his actions were not willful or that 
the district court should have addressed the unraised claim were not preserved 
for appellate review.    
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The record shows that whether Clausen’s probation violation was the 
result of his willful actions was not preserved.  Clausen was terminated from 
mental health court for “noncompliance with its rules.”  (R., p. 192.)  The case 
notes indicate Clausen tested positive for drugs on 3/6/16, initially denied any 
drug use but later admitted drug use, and served 11 days in jail as an 
intermediate sanction.  (R., p. 198.) 
The 4/7/16 note indicates Clausen missed an appointment with a doctor.  
(Id.)  Clausen claimed it was because he forgot to enter the appointment in his 
planner, and he was warned that future missed appointments would not be 
tolerated.  (Id.)  He later admitted that the real reason he missed the appointment 
was that he overslept.  (R., p. 199.) 
The 4/14/16 entry notes that Clausen was kicked out of his housing and 
did not show for mental health court, so a warrant for his arrest was issued.  (R., 
p. 198.)  The warrant was later quashed when Clausen notified his case manager 
where he was, and he was instructed to write an apology letter and an essay on 
how he should have handled the situation.  (Id.)   
On 4/28/16 Clausen “verbally threatened another client in treatment 
group.”  (R., p. 199.)  He also revealed he had stopped taking his medication.  
(Id.)  He was taken into custody until his medication levels were restored.  (Id.) 
The 5/19/16 entry states Clausen did not “pick up his medication as he 
was told to do,” “missed group” because he “refused to walk” and had not 
arranged medical transport through Medicaid (see 4/21/16 entry).  (Id.)  He was 
ordered to serve 7 days in custody as a sanction.  (Id.) 
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On 5/26/16, upon being notified that he was not being released from 
custody, Clausen “punched wall with closed fist, and gave Bailiff quite a bit of 
attitude.”  (Id.) 
The 6/9/16 entry states that Clausen admitted using a controlled 
substance “about a month [into the] program,” missed his appointment because 
he “overslept” (not because he failed to enter the time in his planner), had been 
around people using edible marijuana, and “overusing his melatonin.”  (Id.)  He 
was late to court that day because he “overslept.”  (Id.) 
On 6/30/16 the entry is that Clausen “failed to attend treatment last week,” 
failed to show for a scheduled urinalysis, and was “very rude to front desk 
employees” at his therapist’s office and “threatening to sue them.”  (R., p. 200.)  
Clausen did not have his completed medical paperwork and “threatened” his 
caseworker and probation officer.  (Id.)  He was shortly thereafter terminated 
from the program.  (Id.)   
 At the hearing on the probation violation, Clausen, through counsel, 
represented he had not done well in mental health court because he “did it 
against his will.”  (9/2/16 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 8-22.)  He stated Clausen did not engage in 
“real egregious conduct” and did not “think he did anything wrong,” although 
counsel acknowledged that “the Mental Health Court people have a different 
perspective on it.”  (9/2/16 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 21-25.)  At no point did Clausen claim 
that his actions, which resulted in his termination from mental health court, were 
not willful.  (See generally 9/2/16 Tr.)  Rather, he presented the theory that he 
had performed sufficiently well, and had enough rehabilitative potential, to be 
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placed back on probation on a different program with different treatment 
providers.  (9/2/16 Tr., p. 16, L. 14 – p. 17, L. 15; p. 21, L. 14 – p. 24, L. 16.)  
Because Clausen never claimed that his actions were not willful, but instead 
presented a theory other than lack of willfulness, he cannot claim for the first time 
on appeal that he should have a new hearing so he can litigate the previously 
unraised issue of willfulness. 
 Even if the issue of willfulness were properly raised for the first time on 
appeal, Clausen has failed to show error due to a lack of an express finding of 
willfulness.  When a district court finds a defendant violated his probation, unless 
the district court finds otherwise, the presumption is that the violation was willful.  
See State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 844 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting the 
district court “implicitly determined that Peterson’s disregard of the reporting 
obligation was willful”).  Application of this standard is consistent with the general 
principle that even in the absence of express factual findings, the appellate court 
will uphold any implicit findings by the district court that are supported by 
substantial evidence.  See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 
737 (1986) (“The implicit findings of the trial court, (i.e., that statements of the 
defendant made to the police were voluntary and should not be suppressed) 
should be overturned only if not supported by substantial evidence.”); State v. 
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]ny implicit 
findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence should be given due 
deference.”).  As shown above, Clausen was not terminated from mental health 
court due to an inability to comply with its rules because of poverty or some other 
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reason outside his control; he was terminated because he repeatedly failed to 
comply with the rules, missed appointments, misused drugs, and, when 
confronted about his failure to comply, lied or got belligerent and aggressive.  
The implied finding of willfulness is supported by the record, and there is no 
evidence that Clausen was terminated from mental health court for any reason 
other than his voluntary and willful actions. 
 Finally, any failure of the district court to articulate its finding of willfulness 
is harmless.  Error is harmless if, beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not prejudicial.  
State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578, 114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005).  Clausen 
admitted that he violated his probation as alleged.  (9/2/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 7, 
L. 16.)  The allegations were that Clausen was terminated from drug court 
because he missed appointments, abused drugs, and was abusive to care 
providers and others in the program.  (R., pp. 190-200.)  Clausen presented 
neither a claim nor evidence that he was terminated from drug court for non-
willful conduct.  (9/2/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 15 – p. 7, L. 10; p. 16, L. 3 – p. 17, L. 15; p. 
18, L. 13 – p. 26, L. 24.)  Because nothing in the record suggests the violation 
was anything but willful, the absence of an express finding of willfulness is 
harmless. 
 Clausen claims the district court erred by failing to make an express 
finding of willfulness, and therefore seeks remand to present a theory and 
evidence not presented in the probation violation proceedings.  He has failed to 
show reversible error. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the order revoking 
Clausen’s probation. 
 DATED this 19th day of July, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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